Policy ReseaRch WoRking PaPeR 4337
Statutory marketing boards that have exclusive authority to purchase domestic production, sell for export, and set purchase and sales prices of commodities are a type of state trading enterprise that is subject to World Trade Organization disciplines. This paper assesses a recent dispute brought by the United States against Canada, alleging that WTO rules require state trading enterprises to operate solely in accordance with commercial considerations and that the Canadian government did not require the Canadian Wheat Board to do so. The panel and Appellate Body found that the primary This paper-product of the Trade Team, Development Research Group-is part of a research project on WTO dispute settlement. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at bhoekman@worldbank.org. discipline of the WTO regarding state trading enterprises was nondiscrimination, and that operating on the basis of "commercial considerations" was not an independent obligation. Instead, WTO disciplines regarding the pricing behavior of state trading enterprises use a "commercial considerations" test as a possible indicator of discrimination. Although a significant degree of price discrimination is observed in the case of Canadian wheat exports, there are economic arguments why this might also be pursued by a private, profit maximizing firm.
Introduction
State trading enterprises (STEs) commonly take the form of statutory marketing boards that have exclusive authority to purchase domestic production, to sell for export, and to set purchase and sales prices. They may also capture economies of scale, reducing marketing and other transaction costs for producers (see Secretariat, WTO, 1995) . In the Canada-Wheat case that is the focus of this paper, 1 the U.S. challenged several Canadian measures affecting the purchase and sale of wheat. The main feature of the complaint that we will focus on concerned the Canadian Wheat Board (CWB) export regime for wheat.
The statutory objective of the CWB is to market certain grain grown in Canada in an "orderly manner" in inter-provincial and export trade. The CWB is granted exclusive authority over the sale in export markets and for human consumption in the domestic market of wheat and barley grown in a "designated area." The "designated area" includes the Canadian provinces of Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta and the Peace River area of the province of British Columbia. 2 Thus, the CWB is a monopolist for sales on the domestic and export markets, and a monopsonist for Canadian producers of wheat and barley that operate in the designated area. Exclusive control over both export and domestic sales makes the CWB a so-called "single desk" STE.
The U.S. asserted, inter alia, that the CWB export regime was inconsistent with Canada's obligations under Article XVII:1 of GATT 1994. The U.S. argued that the following three elements, in combination, violated Article XVII:1: (a) the legal framework of the CWB; (b) Canada's provision to the CWB of exclusive and special privileges; and (c) the actions of Canada and the CWB with respect to the CWB's purchases and sales involving wheat exports. 3 That is, these three measures "collectively" constituted the measure challenged: the "CWB Export Regime."
More particularly, the exclusive and special privileges at issue (referred to in item (b) above) were the following:
(i) the exclusive right to purchase and sell Western Canadian wheat for export and domestic human consumption;
(ii) the right to set, subject to government approval, the initial price payable for Western Canadian wheat destined for export or domestic human consumption;
(iii) the government guarantee of the initial payment to producers of Western Canadian wheat;
(iv) the government guarantee of the CWB's borrowing; and (v) government guarantees of certain CWB credit sales to foreign buyers. 4 The U.S. argued that the CWB Export Regime led the CWB to violate Article XVII:1(a) and (b) of GATT. The U.S. challenged the CWB Export Regime as a whole, rather than any individual element. 5 This was understood by the Panel as a "per se"
challenge to the CWB Export Regime, rather than a challenge to a particular action.
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The U.S. claim rested on four broad assertions. First, the privileges enjoyed by the CWB gave it more flexibility with respect to pricing and other sales terms than a commercial actor. This included the ability to pay wheat producers prices below the market price. Second, this flexibility allowed the CWB to offer non-commercial sales terms, denying commercial firms an opportunity to compete. Third, the structure of the CWB induced it to maximize sales, or revenues, rather than profits. Fourth, the Canadian government did not take steps to cause the CWB to comply with Article XVII:1.
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The substance of the U.S. claim was that "the CWB statute does not require the CWB to sell its wheat for export in accordance with commercial considerations, and the CWB maintains the secrecy of its transaction-specific sales practices. Moreover, . . . the exclusive and special privileges enjoyed by the CWB detach the CWB from the economic considerations that would govern the conduct of commercial actors engaged in the purchase and sale of wheat." 8 Thus, the main concern of the U.S. was structural: the issue was a perception that the CWB is structured in a way that ensures that it will not act, The WTO proceeding discussed in this paper is only a part of a larger conflict between Canada and the U.S. over wheat. In a series of domestic investigations, U.S.
authorities determined that Canadian wheat was being subsidized and dumped in the U.S., and was therefore subject to countervailing duties and anti-dumping duties. However, certain of these determinations were appealed to a NAFTA - -1904 - -06 (June 7, 2005 Dec. 12, 2005. as a less attractive alternative compared to these other previously frustrated routes of attack.
State Trading Enterprises and WTO Rules
STEs are used by governments as instruments of regulation. They may be used to achieve a variety of public policy goals in industrial policy, including in relation to the control of imports and exports. As tools of state intervention in the market, STEs may distort competition, and may be inconsistent with liberalization. But of course, this alone does not make them inconsistent with WTO law or policy.
However, it is possible that STEs may be used to circumvent certain WTO commitments with respect to market access and subsidies. 11 They might do so in a number of ways. First, they could circumvent the MFN principle of GATT Article I by discriminating among trading partners in their decisions regarding purchase and sale.
Second, they could circumvent the national treatment principle of GATT Article III by discriminating between domestic and imported goods in their decisions regarding purchases. Third, if they hold exclusive import privileges, they could effectively restrict quantities of imports, inconsistently with the principles of Article XI of GATT. Fourth, they might exercise exclusive import rights to sell domestically at mark-ups that operate similarly to tariffs, but that exceed bound tariffs. Fifth, STEs may use their purchases and sales to subsidize sellers or buyers (Hoekman & Low, 1998) . Much of the possibility for circumvention of WTO commitments is based on the possibility that STE decisionmaking may be opaque, rendering it difficult to determine whether they discriminate or confer subsidies (Hoekman & Low, 1998 ; see also Petersmann, 1998) . It is often difficult to evaluate whether their prices are subsidized (see Horlick & Mowry, 1998) .
During the GATT period, prior to 1995, STEs did not play a major role in trade negotiations, largely because the main sectors and countries in which STEs are activeagriculture, services, and centrally-planned economies-were effectively excluded from GATT disciplines (Hoekman & Low, 1998) (Young, 2005) , while many of the marketing boards that were used by developing country governments to set producer prices and control exports have been dismantled.
The Uruguay Round did not produce additional substantive regulation of STEs.
The U.S. has advocated additional disciplines on STEs, including prohibitions on monopoly rights of STEs (USDA, 2002) . Specifically, the U.S. proposed the following disciplines:
1. Members shall not restrict the right of any interested entity to export, or to purchase for export, agricultural products.
2. No special financing privileges, including government grants, loans, loan guarantees, or underwriting of operational costs, shall be granted to state trading enterprises that export for sale, directly or indirectly, a significant share of the respective Member's total exports of an agricultural product.
3. Any Member that establishes, or maintains, for agricultural products, an export state trading enterprise shall give notice in writing, at least annually, to the Committee on Agriculture, of relevant information, including: initial and subsequent acquisition costs incurred and export prices of products exported or sold for export by such enterprises on a transaction-specific basis. Any Member may request the Member maintaining an export state trading enterprise for agriculture to provide specific information concerning all operations relevant to the export of agricultural products, as described above.
The U.S.' greatest concern has been the CWB, which competes with U.S. firms in world wheat markets, as well as in the U.S. (Abbott & Young , 2003) . However, with the entry of China into the WTO, and the expected entry of Russia, there is clearly a more general interest to ensure that STEs are not used to undercut market access and subsidization commitments.
Economic Dimensions
The conflict that gave rise to the present case essentially revolves around competition for third markets, as both countries are major producers of wheat and large net exporters.
Whereas Canada uses the CWB as the conduit for its exports of wheat, the U.S. relies on a small number of large private firms to market wheat on export markets. Prior to the Uruguay Round (1995) U.S. producers could benefit from export subsidies -through the U.S. Export Enhancement Program. One result of the Uruguay Round was to impose disciplines on export subsidy policies. A corollary was that U.S. and other producers in countries that had benefited from export subsidies perceived an "unfair" asymmetry to have emerged: they had become subject to disciplines, whereas countries with statetrading agencies might be able to continue to price discriminate across markets and effectively subsidize exports.
From an economic perspective the relevant questions are whether (i) STEs such as the CWB do indeed engage in price discrimination on export markets; and (ii) this is a reflection of de facto export subsidization made possible by the way the CWB is structured and operates.
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A legal issue that arises insofar as the CWB can be argued to engage in subsidization of exports is to what extent such behavior is (can be) disciplined through other WTO provisions, e.g., the Agreement on Agriculture disciplines. Article XVII WTO does not deal with de jure subsidization -this is (must be) addressed through export subsidy disciplines. However, if STE behavior results in de facto subsidization because of discriminatory pricing behavior and exploitation of market power, Article XVII may be violated. While other WTO provisions apply, and might be violated by the same behavior, Article XVII may provide a more effective means by which to discipline this behavior. Furthermore, to the extent that the economic "subsidization" would not qualify as legal "subsidization" because it involves a benefit being required to be provided by private Canadian producers to the CWB, rather than a benefit being provided by government, no WTO subsidies disciplines would apply.
Thus, the reason for the U.S. concern with the structure of the CWB in this case seems to have been the risk of implicit subsidization in the economic sense if not in the WTO legal sense. Single desk status potentially gives the CWB the economic power to 12 I.e., the observed discrimination would not also be pursued by a profit maximizing private firm. Note that the focus in this paper is on exporting STEs, not importing STEs. In practice, STEs in net importers may circumvent negotiated market access commitments through their behavior. This became more important post-Uruguay Round due to the shift to tariffication of agricultural protection and the use of tariff rate quotas (TRQs) to guarantee minimum access to highly protected markets. These TRQs require management (allocation mechanisms), something that may be done by STEs. Article XVII arguably is primarily focused on this type of issue: a complement to other GATT articles that aim to preclude use of alternative instruments to restrict access more than what has been negotiated through tariff bindings. While the U.S. did contest import-related issues, it did not appeal any of the Panel findings in this area.
price discriminate or to cross-subsidize between domestic and foreign markets. However, such price discrimination may reflect market factors (demand conditions in different markets) and differences in product composition (quality) as well as the monopolist-cummonopsonist status of the CWB.
The CWB engages in a number of practices that may allow it to reduce prices on export markets below what competitors can charge in the absence of export subsidies.
One of these is a two-part payment system under which farmers obtain only partial payment for their crops when delivered to the CWB. This first payment is determined by a minimum price for farmers, guaranteed by the government. It is supplemented by a final payment once output has been sold on export markets and selling expenses, overhead etc. have been netted out. The CWB also engages in price pooling: domestic producers are paid the average price (net of costs) obtained for a specific quality/variety of wheat and barley on the domestic and all export markets.
The combination of price pooling and two-part payment scheme may result in the CWB being able to price below competitors by credibly lowering the costs of the output that is exported (i.e., low initial payments could be used as a credible pre-commitment device in an export competition game) and/or through cross-subsidization by "pricing to market" -insofar as this entails losses on some export markets this can be compensated by higher prices on other markets. The two-part pricing scheme may in effect imply that the CWB is being given a short-term "loan" by Canadian farmers, as they must accept the minimum, initial, average price offered by the CWB. In addition, the CWB benefits from government guarantees of both its debt and certain credits it may grant its foreign buyers.
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As a result of its exclusivity rights, the CWB can engage in a variety of strategies.
Which strategy it will pursue will depend on the underlying objectives it has been assigned. As a government entity, the objective of the CWB is not necessarily profit maximization. Indeed, a rationale for the creation and operation of STEs generally includes equity as well as efficiency objectives. In the field of agriculture, STEs can serve important public policy purposes, such as price support or stabilization, internalization of externalities (quality and associated reputational benefits for the country as a whole), and income redistribution. Thus, in addition to exploitation of national market power by aggregating the supplies of many small farmers (economies of scale, etc.), STEs often act to redistribute income towards --or more frequently, away from --farmers. The latter objective has often been important in developing countries, where governments seek to use low producer prices as a means of transferring resources to consumers of food in urban areas or to support investments elsewhere in the economy.
Knowing what the underlying national objectives are is clearly important from the perspective of national welfare and the evaluation/design of policy. However, what the objectives are is not always relevant from a WTO perspective, as its focus may be only on the question whether the trade impacts of a policy result in discrimination that goes beyond what a country may impose given its commitments in the WTO. As a result, WTO rules in this area, as in others, may result in incentives for countries to use less efficient instruments to pursue a given objective. In the case of STEs, for example, if the underlying objective is to raise exports, explicit export subsidies may be the more efficient (and transparent) instrument. For example, simple economic theory suggests that for a given target increase in domestic production, the use of export subsidies will generate lower welfare costs for the imposing country than an STE that uses price pooling as a way of raising average prices for farmers (see Alston & Gray, 2000) . 14 Canada is a major wheat exporter. Thus, it has some market power on the world market. In this connection it is important to recognize that Canadian wheat is a differentiated product. For a given type of wheat, it is of more uniform and of higher average quality than U.S. wheat. In part this is because of the operation of the CWB, which sets minimum standards and specifies the type of seeds that may be used for a given quality/type of wheat or barley that is to be procured and exported.
The empirical literature on the global wheat market suggests that this may be best characterized as a quantity-setting oligopoly. In the case of barley, price setting does not 14 Important questions for domestic policy and assessing the costs and benefits of alternative instruments are the size of the excess burden of taxation needed to finance export subsidies and administrative costs (transfer efficiency), the incidence of the "tax" that is used to generate a given transfer to farmerstaxpayers in the case of export subsidies, consumers in the case of STEs, whether the STE is being used as a mechanism to ensure that a greater share of profits accrue to farmers instead of middlemen/traders (the concentration ratio of wholesalers/distributors in the U.S. is over 75% for example), etc. In this paper we abstract from these types of domestic policy questions. appear to be supported by the data -STEs and other suppliers do not have market leadership and can be characterized as engaging in Cournot competition. In the case of wheat, the CWB engages in price discrimination, but much if not most of this reportedly reflects the fact that there are significant quality differences among types of wheat exported to different markets. 15 Moreover, research suggests that the CWB does not set initial prices to farmers optimally from a profit maximization/rent shifting perspective.
Prices paid to farmers are "too high": producers receive a higher average price than they should if the CWB was seeking to maximize profits. This suggests either that strategic motivations do not drive pricing decisions, that regulation and other oversight of the CWB ensures that interests of farmers dominate, or that because of the nature of the differentiated products it makes more sense to focus on measures to improve quality and exploit quality differences (Lavoie, 2005 and Dong, Marsh & Stiegert, 2006) . 16 In practice it appears that the CWB obtains a premium price for many of its exports, rather than selling output at "subsidized" levels, reflecting the higher quality/differentiated nature of its exports (Lavoie, 2005 and Sumner & Boltuck, 2004) .
As discussed further below, what matters from the perspective of the WTO (Article XVII) is whether any observed price discrimination across foreign markets or between domestic and foreign markets would also be pursued by a private firm (such as cooperative of farmers). Independent of the specific features of the CWB -such as price pooling -the evidence of extensive product differentiation in the wheat market suggests that private firms would also pursue price discrimination strategies in markets where they have (some) pricing power. That in turn suggests that in practice it is difficult to establish a private "commercial" counterfactual where discrimination would not be optimal.
The Disciplines of Article XVII
Article XVII:1 of GATT applies to STEs and provides as follows:
15 See Lavoie, 2005 and Dong, Marsh & Stiegert, 2006 , for recent empirical analyses of the operation of the CWB in wheat and barley markets, respectively. These papers also contain extensive references to the economic literature on STEs in general and the CWB in particular. 16 Note that insofar as average total prices paid to Canadian producers are not suppressed so as to maximize the profits of the CWB, this may have the effect of increasing total output, enhancing competition on world markets. The same outcome may result from price pooling (paying farmers the average price obtained across all markets).
1.* 17 (a) Each contracting party undertakes that if it establishes or maintains a State enterprise, wherever located, or grants to any enterprise, formally or in effect, exclusive or special privileges,* such enterprise shall, in its purchases or sales involving either imports or exports, act in a manner consistent with the general principles of nondiscriminatory treatment prescribed in this Agreement for governmental measures affecting imports or exports by private traders.
The provisions of subparagraph (a) of this paragraph shall be understood to require that such enterprises shall, having due regard to the other provisions of this Agreement, make any such purchases or sales solely in accordance with commercial considerations,* including price, quality, availability, marketability, transportation and other conditions of purchase or sale, and shall afford the enterprises of the other contracting parties adequate opportunity, in accordance with customary business practice, to compete for participation in such purchases or sales.
Scope of Application of Article XVII:1
GATT does not define STEs. The Uruguay Round Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XVII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (the "Understanding") provides a working definition for STEs, to be used to determine the scope of the obligation of notification specified in the Understanding:
Governmental and non-governmental enterprises, including marketing boards, which have been granted exclusive or special rights or privileges, including statutory or constitutional powers, in the exercise of which they influence through their purchases or sales the level or direction of imports or exports.
Importantly, the essence of this definition is first, that there are exclusive or special privileges, and second, that in the exercise of these powers, the STE influences through purchases or sales the level or direction of imports or exports.
However, the definition contained in the Understanding is narrower than the scope of application of Article XVII:1. The Appellate Body cited the Panel's statement that "Like the parties, the Panel uses the term 'STE' or 'state trading enterprise' to refer to both types of enterprises covered by Article XVII:1, i.e., State enterprises or enterprises that have formally or in effect been granted exclusive or special privileges." 18 17 Asterisks refer to "ad notes" that form part of the GATT. For example, and as relevant to this case, the ad note to Article XVII:1 provides, inter alia, that "The charging by a state enterprise of different prices for its sales of a product in different markets is not precluded by the provisions of this Article, provided that such different prices are charged for commercial reasons, to meet conditions of supply and demand in export markets." 18 Appellate Body Report, para. 114, citing Panel Report, para. 6.33.
In the present case, there was no dispute as to whether the CWB is an STE, as Canada had notified the CWB as an STE. A conclusion that the principle of non-discrimination was violated would suffice to prove a violation of Article XVII; similarly, a conclusion that a decision to purchase or buy was this understanding seems to lack textual support and it is difficult to see how it would apply.
Commercial Considerations
The U.S. argued that " [w] here an export STE has been granted special and exclusive privileges which permit it to operate without the normal market constraints faced by a commercial actor, that STE could make use of its privileges to gain market share in particular markets, but such behaviour would not be commercial." 44 Under this reading, the prohibition of non-commercial considerations could have a scope that goes beyond discrimination: it would not necessarily be discriminatory to seek to maximize market share, but it would, according to the U.S., be "non-commercial." However, there seems little reason to believe that a requirement of commercial considerations excludes a goal of increasing market share.
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The Appellate Body confirmed the Panel's understanding of the term "commercial considerations:"
The Panel began its analysis by considering the meaning of the term "commercial considerations" in subparagraph (b) and found that this term should be understood as meaning "considerations pertaining to commerce and trade, or considerations which involve regarding purchases or sales 'as mere matters of business'." The Panel also determined that the requirement that STEs act solely in accordance with such considerations "must imply that they should seek to purchase or sell on terms which are economically advantageous for themselves and/or their owners, members, beneficiaries, etc." Thus, the Panel interpreted the term "commercial considerations" as encompassing a range of different considerations that are defined in any given case by the type of "business" involved (purchases or sales), and by the economic considerations that motivate actors engaged in business in the relevant market(s). 
Competition and STE Behavior
The central question addressed in this case by the Appellate Body was whether the non-discriminatory treatment prong of (a) is independent of the commercial considerations prong of subparagraph (b). The U.S. argued that these were independent, several obligations, either of which could be the basis for a successful attack. The
Appellate Body concluded that subparagraph (b) clarifies the scope of the nondiscrimination obligation in subparagraph (a as agents of public policy, so long as they comply with the non-discrimination requirements of Article XVII. The Panel articulated this concept: "Finally, the United
States' argument that STEs must act like 'commercial actors' tends to overlook the fact that STEs are not necessarily used only for commercial purposes. STEs may also be established or maintained to carry out governmental policies or programmes (e.g., policies related to food security, policies aimed at reducing alcohol consumption, policies to achieve price stabilization, etc.)."
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The U.S. also argued that the second clause of subparagraph (b) of Article XVII:1-requiring STEs to "afford the enterprises of other Members adequate opportunity . . . to compete for participation in such purchases or sales"-requires that adequate opportunities be afforded to enterprises that wished to sell in competition with the STE. 54 However, the Appellate body found that the term "such purchases or sales" refers back to subparagraph (a), which addresses purchases and sales by the STE, not by competing enterprises. Thus, the requisite adequate opportunity is to be a purchaser or seller counterpart to the STE, not to be a competitor to the STE.
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The Appellate Body's understanding has important substantive ramifications.
There is no independent obligation of decision-making in accordance with commercial considerations. Subparagraph (b) is neither a source of independent obligations, nor a basis for finding a deemed violation of subparagraph (a). Paragraph 145 of the Appellate Body Report is worth quoting in full:
At the same time, our interpretation of the relationship between subparagraphs (a) and (b) of Article XVII:1 necessarily implies that the scope of the inquiry to be undertaken under subparagraph (b) must be governed by the principles of subparagraph (a). In other words, a panel inquiring whether an STE has acted solely in accordance with commercial considerations must undertake this inquiry with respect to the market(s) in which the STE is alleged to be engaging in discriminatory conduct. Subparagraph (b) does not give panels a mandate to engage in a broader inquiry into whether, in the abstract, STEs are acting "commercially". The disciplines of Article XVII:1 are aimed at preventing certain types of discriminatory behaviour. We see no basis for interpreting that provision as imposing comprehensive competition- similar to a private domestic monopolist (See McCorriston & MacLaren, 2002) . A private domestic monopolist would have the power to price discriminate and to cross-subsidize, but would lack the interest that a STE might have in providing a net subsidy. So, assuming for a moment that the extent of STE net subsidization could be identified and addressed through WTO subsidies law, the other concerns are similar.
In the debate regarding competition policy at the WTO, proponents argue that states have incentives to externalize anticompetitive effects on one another through lax enforcement of competition law when the adverse effects occur abroad (See Guzman, 2001 and 2004) . The STE context is more direct. States are not simply failing to have or enforce competition law: they are directly establishing monopolies. Indeed, Sir Leon
Brittan has opined as follows:
I should at this point raise a related issue concerning state trading, in other words, where a government has a special right to a designated corporation to import or export or to distribute certain goods . . . . I think that, if we are to look at international competition rules seriously, the time is ripe to consider whether this antiquated form of monopoly trading can be phased out altogether (1997).
That said, there is an important difference between the domain of competition policy, especially if defined in U.S. terms as antitrust law and enforcement, and STEs. Paddock, 1998) . In addition to questions regarding the assumption of perfect competition, it should also be borne in mind that STEs may maximize total producer surplus rather than profits (McCorriston & MacLaren, 2002) .
Article XVII and Article III
There has been some dispute as to whether Article XVII:1 includes a prohibition of discrimination in the national treatment sense (the Article III sense), in addition to a prohibition of discrimination in the MFN sense (Petersmann, 1998 This would appear to be the result under Article XVI:4 of the WTO Charter.
On the other hand, there is some question whether the disciplines of Article XVII are subsumed by other provisions of GATT, including Article III. "It is noteworthy that in the past, no GATT or WTO dispute settlement report has established a violation of Article XVII. The claims of GATT-inconsistent discrimination were always decided in favour of the complainants directly on the basis of Articles I, III, and XI rather than on
Article XVII" (Petersmann, 1998 Canada, Australia, China, and the European Communities all disagree with the United States' reasoning. Essentially, they argue that accepting the United States' view of Article XVII:1(b) would force STEs to refrain from using any of the special rights or privileges that they may enjoy and, thereby, put them at a competitive disadvantage as compared to private enterprises, which can and do exercise any and all market power they can muster. These participants argue that any such interpretation would be inconsistent with the explicit recognition, in Article XVII:1, that Members are entitled to establish and maintain STEs and to grant them exclusive or special privileges. If discrimination requires differential treatment of imported and domestic products-as would seem to be suggested by "non-discriminatory treatment prescribed in this Agreement for governmental measures affecting imports or exports by private traders"-then there will be cases in which subparagraph (a) is narrower than subparagraph (b). That is, there will be cases where the application of non-commercial considerations has no international differential or discriminatory intent or impact. We do not yet know how future panels, and the Appellate Body, will define discrimination under The Appellate Body decision does not require that STE behavior be commercial, or even efficient, but maintains the requirement that STE behavior must be nondiscriminatory-that it not impose adverse effects on other states through discrimination.
The definition of discrimination may pose some difficulty, but if the focus is on aim and effects, application of Article XVII will address the intentional distortions, leaving unintentional distortions in place. This seems a reasonable balance between the right to trade and the right to regulate.
Of course, if the Appellate Body had agreed with the U.S. that there is an independent obligation to act solely in accordance with commercial considerations, it would have introduced a procrustean requirement that STEs act as though they were not STEs. The Appellate Body would have inappropriately caused the WTO to take sides in connection with the choice between different types of organization of the economy of member states.
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Notwithstanding the resolution of this case, it is not clear that the CWB will continue to operate in its current configuration. Some Canadian farm groups are of the 68 See Cottier & Mavroidis, 1998 , warning against such intervention.
view that abolishing the monopoly marketing and purchasing rights of the CWB would be beneficial to them. Forces for reform include the government of Alberta, which has commissioned a study on how the monopoly might be phased out. While pressure from trading partners may have played a role in focusing attention on the efficiency and equity performance of the CWB, more important appears to have been perceptions that the performance of the CWB can be improved upon, and the experience of New Zealand and Australia in moving towards a private sector/cooperative model of export marketing.
69

Annex
Article XVII State Trading Enterprises 1.* (a) Each contracting party undertakes that if it establishes or maintains a State enterprise, wherever located, or grants to any enterprise, formally or in effect, exclusive or special privileges,* such enterprise shall, in its purchases or sales involving either imports or exports, act in a manner consistent with the general principles of non-discriminatory treatment prescribed in this Agreement for governmental measures affecting imports or exports by private traders.
(b) The provisions of subparagraph (a) of this paragraph shall be understood to require that such enterprises shall, having due regard to the other provisions of this Agreement, make any such purchases or sales solely in accordance with commercial considerations,* including price, quality, availability, marketability, transportation and other conditions of purchase or sale, and shall afford the enterprises of the other contracting parties adequate opportunity, in accordance with customary business practice, to compete for participation in such purchases or sales.
Relevant ad notes, included in the treaty, follow:
Paragraph 1
The operations of Marketing Boards, which are established by contracting parties and are engaged in purchasing or selling, are subject to the provisions of subparagraphs (a) and (b).
The activities of Marketing Boards which are established by contracting parties and which do not purchase or sell but lay down regulations covering private trade are governed by the relevant Articles of this Agreement.
The charging by a state enterprise of different prices for its sales of a product in different markets is not precluded by the provisions of this Article, provided that such different prices are charged for commercial reasons, to meet conditions of supply and demand in export markets.
Paragraph 1 (a) Governmental measures imposed to insure standards of quality and efficiency in the operation of external trade, or privileges granted for the exploitation of national natural resources but which do not empower the government to exercise control over the trading activities of the enterprise in question, do not constitute "exclusive or special privileges".
